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we explore the properties of welfare-maximizing monetary policy in a medium-scale Dsge model for Hungary. in order 
to make our results operational from a policymaker’s perspective, we approximate the optimal policy rule with a set of 
simple rules reacting only to observable variables. our results suggest that “science of monetary policy” that is found robust 
in simple models, holds in this medium-scaled setting as well. That is, the welfare-maximizing policy that aims to eliminate 
distortions associated with nominal rigidities can be approximated by a simple inflation targeting rule. adding exchange 
rate into the feedback rule only marginally improves the stabilization properties of the policy rule. However, a rule reacting 
to wage inflation can be significantly welfare-improving. These results may suggest that in our medium-sized model the 
distortions associated with sticky wage setting have at least as important welfare implications as those related to the price 
stickiness in product markets.
JEL: e52, e58, e61.
Keywords: monetary policy, central banking, policy design.
a tanulmányban a jólét-maximalizáló monetáris politika tulajdonságait vizsgáljuk egy közepes méretű Dsge-modell kere-
tein belül. ahhoz, hogy az eredményeket a monetáris politika döntéshozói számára alkalmazhatóvá tegyük, az optimális 
szabályt olyan „egyszerű szabályokkal” közelítjük, amelyek csak megfigyelhető változókra reagálnak. eredményeink azt 
mutatják, hogy az egyszerűbb modellekre robusztusnak talált monetáris politikai összefüggések közepes méretű model-
lünkre is igazak. Vagyis a nominális merevségekből származó társadalmi veszteségeket minimalizáló monetáris szabály jól 
közelíthető az inflációs célkövetésnek megfelelő egyszerű szabállyal. az árfolyamra is reagáló szabály ehhez képest csak 
elhanyagolható társadalmi jóléti növekményt képes felmutatni, ugyanakkor az a szabály, amely a fogyasztói inflációra és a 
bérinflációra is reagál, jelentős jólétnövelő hatással jár. ezek az eredmények arra engednek következtetni, hogy közepes 
méretű modellünkben a nominális bérek merevségéből eredő jóléti veszteségek legalább olyan fontosak, mint az árupiac 
nominális merevségéből származók.
Abstract




a well-deﬁned welfare measure (i.e. utility). Consequently, the models can be solved for the optimal (welfare-
maximizing) policies. In thispaper we explore optimalmonetary policy in amedium-scaled DSGE modelfor
Hungary. We apply the linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation to the optimal policy problem, as suggested by
Benigno & Woodford (2007), and use the standardised algorithm proposed by Altissimo et al. (2005). While
the solution to the optimal policy problem is a useful benchmark for monetary policy evaluation, it is not
operational from a central bank’s perspective. To make our results easier to interpret, we approximate the
welfare-maximizing policy rule with a set of simple rules reacting only to observable variables. We evaluate
the overall performance and the stabilization properties of various simple monetary policy rules.
Motivation for this paper is twofold. The ﬁrst is practical, by exploring optimal monetary policy and the
simple feedback rules that can approximate it, our research aims to provide guidance to monetary policy
in Hungary. Second, we believe that the way we model openness is more realistic than usually done in the
literature. Our model is a two-sector open economy with imports as an input to production. Thus, from a
theoretical point of view, our contribution is to examine how the way openness is modelled may change the
ﬁndings on optimal policy that hold in more simple open-economy models.
RELATED LITERATURE
In economies with nominal rigidities, monetary policy has real effects and can therefore inﬂuence welfare.
The classical insight by Clarida et al. (1999) stresses that sticky prices cause unintended ﬂuctuations in pro-
ducers’ mark-ups in face of shocks hitting the economy (and, hence, producers’ marginal costs). By moving
the policy rate, monetary policy can offset variations in the marginal cost, and therefore eliminate incentives
for producers to change prices. That is, monetary policy can assure that mark-ups are kept at their desired
level and prices remain unchanged. If the only source of inefﬁciency is price stickiness, stabilizing prices
constitutes an optimal policy. Moreover, a simple feedback rule with a strong enough reaction to inﬂation
can approximate the optimal policy. As was shown by Erceg et al. (2000) if nominal wages are also rigid,
and cause efﬁciency losses in the labor market, too, then the optimal feedback rule should include a measure
of wage inﬂation, too. Aoki (2001) showed in a two-sector closed-economy setup that if there are different
degrees of price stickiness in the sectors of the economy, the sectoral relative price distortion should also be
corrected for. The policy rate should react to inﬂation in both sectors with higher weight given to the sector
with more sticky price setting.
Classical papers on the optimal monetary policy in an open economy reinforce the ﬁndings of simple closed-
economy models. Clarida et al. (2001), Clarida et al. (2002) conclude that the optimal policy problem for
the small open economy is isomorphic to the closed economy case. In particular, the small open economy
dynamics can be reduced to a ﬁrst order, two-equation dynamic system for domestic inﬂation and the output
gap whose structure is identical to the one associated with the workhorse sticky price model of a closed econ-
omy. Again, the optimal policy should seek to stabilize domestic inﬂation (hence eliminate the distortion
due to sticky domestic price setting), and the form of the interest rate rule is not affected by the openness of
theeconomy. AsimilarresultisobtainedinGali&Monacelli(2005)wherestrictdomesticinﬂationtargeting
turns out to be the optimal monetary policy, consequently outperforming a CPI inﬂation targeting rule.
As CPI is the average of domestic and import prices, and as such, is directly related to the nominal exchange
rate, the striking implication of the papers above is that optimal monetary policy should not react to vari-
ations in the exchange rate. Put differently, the appropriate target variable is domestic, as opposed to CPI
inﬂation. As this implication is in sharp contrast to communicated objectives of real-world central banks,
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many successive papers challenge on it. A higher elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods, higher coefﬁcient for risk aversion and incomplete exchange rate pass-through all help in justifying
CPI targeting, or concern for exchange rate movements (see Sutherland (2006), Paoli (2009)). Campolmi
(2009) argues that the inclusion of sticky wages in an otherwise standard small open economy model also
rationalizes CPI inﬂation targeting.
As to our knowledge, no paper is available on the properties of the welfare-maximizing policy of an empir-
ically motivated, full-ﬂedged small open economy model. Adolfson et al. (2008) do a similar exercise based
on the estimated DSGE model for Sweden, however, they purposely refrain from deriving the central bank
objective from micro behavior, and simply assume a "sensible" loss function. The same is true for Baltini
et al. (2001) who study optimal simple rules in a DSGE model for the UK.
OUTLINE OF THE PAPER
We describe the model in the next section. In Section 3, we lay out the policymaker’s problem and solution
method. We proceed by a comparative analysis of the optimal monetary policy rule to the estimated one.
Further, we approximate optimal monetary policy by a set of simple feedback rules, and compare their
stabilization properties to both the fully optimal and the empirical one. In the last section, we conclude and
set the directions for further research.
4 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/4MNB WORKiNg pApERS • 2010/4 8
2 The model economy
Themodelweuseisatwo-sectordynamicstochasticgeneralequilibrium(DSGE)small-open-economymodel
for the Hungarian economy. The two sectors produce domestic and exported ﬁnal goods. Following Chris-
tiano et al. (2005) and Smets & Wouters (2003), our model features different types of frictions, real and
nominal rigidities which are necessary to replicate the empirical persistence of Hungarian data. The model
incorporates external habit formation in consumption, Calvo-type price and wage rigidity complemented
with indexation to past price and wage inﬂation, adjustment costs of investments, adjustment cost of capital,
labor and import utilization and ﬁxed cost in production. We follow the approach of McCallum & Nelson
(2001), and consider imports as production input.
The detailed description is available in Jakab & Világi (2008),1 here we just give a short description of the
objectives and constraints that the agents in the economy solve. The log-linearized model equations are
presented fully in Appendix A.2 Parametrization of the model is given in Appendix B.
HOUSEHOLDS
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0,1). They are inﬁnitely lived,
and choose their consumption stream in the standard rational optimizing manner. Households have labor
and capital income and they own the production sector of the economy. They have identical preferences and
differ in only one respect: they supply differentiated labor to ﬁrms.













where Ht(j) = ct(j)−hct−1, where ct−1 is aggregate consumption at date t−1, parameter h ∈ [0,1] measures
the strength of external habit formation, lt(j) is the labor supply of household j, ηc
t and ηl
t are preference
shocks. Furthermore, preferences are additively separable, with the usual constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) speciﬁcation, that is u(H) = H1−σ/(1−σ), and v(l) = l1+ϕ/(1+ϕ), σ, ϕ > 0.




t (j)+Wt(j)lt(j)+Pt r k
t ut(j)kt−1(j)−Ψ(ut(j))Ptkt−1(j)
+Divt −Tt, (2)
1 There are two major differences from the Jakab & Világi (2008) model. Rule-of-thumb consumers are assumed away. The reason is that their presence
makes the problem of the social planner cumbersome (see Gali et al. (2004)), and much less operational from a central bank perspective. A general
claim (see Adolfson et al. (2008)) that the approximation of household welfare is very model-dependent and aggregating utilities with heterogenous
agents might be problematic. Even though Jakab & Világi (2008) found these type of agents helpful in matching the model to data, in this excercise we
dropped them.
We didn’t include the learning mechanism of the ’underlying inﬂation’. A special feature of the Jakab-Világi model is that agents’ ’perception on
underlying inﬂation’ is made endogenous by a real-time adaptive learning algorithm. As this percieved inﬂation term enters the price-setting mechanism
(and serves as a nominal anchor for rule-of-thumb price setters), this ’underlying’ inﬂation heavily inﬂuences long-term inﬂation developments. In fact,
the speed of learning was interpreted as a measure for monetary policy credibility (or the lack thereof). Throughout optimal monetary policy calculations,
we drop the learning mechanism. The reason is that the optimal policy calculations assume full commitment under timeless perspective which can
also be thought of having a fully credible central bank. For remaining consistent to the assumptions implicit in the approach we take, we abstract from
potential problems of imperfect commitment.
2 Variables with no time index refer to steady state values, variables with asterisk denote foreign variables (or variables measured in foreign currency).
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where Pt is the consumer price index, Bt(j) is the household’s holding of riskless nominal bonds at the
beginning of t, it is the one-period nominal interest rate, Divt denotes dividends from ﬁrms. kt(j) is the
stock of physical capital supplied, ut(j) is the utilization rate of capital. Tt denotes the lump-sum tax. It(j)
denotes investments in physical capital. Wt(j) is the nominal wage paid to household j, X w
t is a state-
contingent security which eliminates the risk of heterogeneous labor supply and labor income.3 The cost of















This implies that in the steady state (u = 1) Ψ(1) = 0.
Physical capital accumulation:









where function ΦI represents investments adjustment costs, and ηI
















, φI > 0. (5)
This implies that ΦI ￿ 0, and in the steady state ΦI(1) = Φ￿
I(1) = 0.
Households choose the paths of consumption, bond holdings, investment and capacity utilization to max-
imize (1) subject to constraints (2)-(5). The log-linearized ﬁrst order conditions are presented in Appendix
A.
Wage setting
A household supplying type j of labor belongs to a trade-union representing the interest of households of
type j. The union determines the labor supply and the nominal wage of its members. Union j sets Wt(j),
the nominal wage level of type j of labor. The composite labor input of the economy is a CES aggregate of











w > 1 is elasticity of substitution between different types of labor. The demand for labor supplied
















There is sticky wage setting. Every union at a given date changes its wage in a rational, optimizing forward-
looking manner with probability 1−γw. Unions, which do not optimize at the given date follow a rule of






3 Due to the existence of asset X w
t , all households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks to income. Consequently, incomes of all
households are the same, and all households choose the same consumption allocation. We, therefore, drop index j from subsequent notations.
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t is the nominal wage inﬂation, πt is consumer price inﬂation, wt is the real wage, and ϑw represents
the degree of indexation to past wage inﬂation. The optimization exercise is described in details in Jakab &
Világi (2008), the log-linearized equation characterizing the solution to the optimal wage setting problem (i.e.
the wage Phillips curve) is given in Appendix A.
FIRMS
Domestic and exported ﬁnal goods are produced in different sectors. The structure of the sectors are identi-
cal, however the imported input and capital requirement of production in the exports sector is higher (or put
differently, the domestic sector is more labor-intensive). This assumption is necessary to reproduce the em-
pirical co-movement of exports and imports. Price formation mechanisms are similar in both sectors, they
are captured by the sticky-price model of Calvo, however the exporters set their prices in foreign currency
(local currency pricing).
Production has a hierarchical structure: at the ﬁrst stage labor and imported inputs are transformed into an
intermediate input in a perfectly competitive industry. At the second stage the intermediate input and capital
are used to produce differentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive industry. Finally, a homogenous
ﬁnal good is produced from the differentiated goods in a perfectly competitive environment. There are two
sectors in the economy: a domestic production sector and an exports sector, labeled by d and x, respectively.
Competitive producers of ﬁnal goods
Final good ys
t in sector s (s = d,x) is produced in a competitive market by a constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy from a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods ys
t(i), i ∈ [0,1]. The technology is represented
























t (i) denotes the prices of differentiated goods ys
t(i), and the demand for ys











Monopolistically competitive producers of intermediate goods
The continuum of goods ys
t(i) is produced in a monopolistically competitive market. Each ys
t(i) is made by


















− ¯ fs, (11)
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where ¯ ks
t(i) is the ﬁrm’s effective utilization of physical capital, ¯ ks
t(i) = utks
t(i), where ut is the degree
of capacity utilization given from the households’ decision, ks
t(i) the ﬁrm’s utilization of the homogenous
capital good. zs
t(i) is the ﬁrm’s utilization of a composite intermediate input good zs
t. Variable At is a
uniform exogenous productivity factor and ¯ fs is uniform real ﬁxed cost of the industry. The parameter 0 < ￿
measures the elasticity of substitution between ¯ ks
t and zs
t and 0 < ¯ αs < 1 measures the steady-state share of
capital in marginal cost of production. Good zs
t(i) is composed by composite labor and imported inputs.
Solution of ﬁrms’ cost minimization problem and the implied marginal costs in the two sectors are described
in detail in Jakab & Világi (2008), and log-linearized equations are presented in the Appendix.
Price setting
Let us consider how monopolistically competitive ﬁrms set their prices. To simplify the exposition, we
discuss the general features of price setting of domestic and export producers.4 It is assumed that prices are
sticky: as in the model of Calvo (1983), each intermediate good producer at a given date changes its price in
a rational, optimizing, forward-looking way with a constant probability of 1− γ s (s = d,x). Those ﬁrms
which do not optimize at the given date follow a rule of thumb. Rule of thumb price setters increase their
prices by past rate of inﬂation, as in Yun (1996). Formally, if ﬁrm i does not optimize at date t
P s
t (i) = P s
t−1(i)ΠIs







t−1 = P s
t−1/P s
t−2, ϑs measures the degree of indexation to past inﬂation. The above formula implies
if a given ﬁrm does not optimize between t +1 and T its price at date T is given by
P s
T(i) = P s
t (i)ΠIs






t (i) is the chosen price of a ﬁrm at date t, then its proﬁt at date T will be
VT(P s







− ¯ f .


















and λt is the marginal utility of consumption of households, who own the ﬁrms. That is, ﬁrms seek to maxi-
mize (13) subject to constraints (10) and (12). The solution of the ﬁrms’ price setting problem is described in
detail in Jakab & Világi (2008), while the log-linearized Phillips-curves for both sectors are in Appendix A.
Competitive producers of the composite intermediate input





























4 The price setting problem of domestic and export producers are very similar. Note however that we allow for differences in both the Calvo parameter
and the indexation coefﬁcient. Note also that exporters set prices in foreign currency.
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detail in Jakab & Világi (2008), while the log-linearized Phillips-curves for both sectors are in Appendix A.
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4 The price setting problem of domestic and export producers are very similar. Note however that we allow for differences in both the Calvo parameter
and the indexation coefﬁcient. Note also that exporters set prices in foreign currency.
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x∗ is the price elasticity, and ηx
t is a shock to foreign demand, x∗.
Also, the price of imports (P m∗
t ) in foreign currency is set exogenously abroad:
P m∗
t = (1+ηP m∗
t )P m∗.
Financial ﬂows
In terms of credit ﬂows, the rest of the world is represented by an ad hoc upward-sloping credit supply curve
(á lá Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003)):
1+i∗
t
1+i∗ = exp(−ν(bt − b))(1+η
pr
t ), (17)
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where i∗
t is the foreign-currency denominated interest on domestic assets, bt is the net foreign asset position
of the economy (given in terms of foreign currency), and η
pr
t is a risk-premium shock.
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out the simulations, the posterior means of the parameters were chosen. While most parameters fall close to
usual-in-the-literature values, two qualiﬁcations stand out.
First, the estimated Calvo and indexation parameters suggest that price setting is most ﬂexible in the exports
sectorwithboththeprobabilityofresettingpricesoptimallyandthedegreeofindexationtopastinﬂationfor
rule-of-thumb price setters being the highest.5 Domestic product market comes close second, while nominal
rigidities are most pervasive in the labor market.
Monetary policy is characterised by a simple feedback rule reacting to domestic inﬂation and the exchange
rate.6 The coefﬁcient of inﬂation is less than 1.4, less than the standard baseline estimate of 1.5 (Clarida-Gali-
Gertler). While this is an empirical characterisation of the Hungarian monetary policy, it can be interpreted
as a warning that the empirically motivated policy rule is possibly too "dovish". Note also that the coefﬁcient
on the nominal rate suggests that monetary policy doesn’t target the nominal exchange rate directly.
5 Note that indexation to past inﬂation somewhat relaxes the rigidity of prices. That is, it provides price setters who cannot fully optimize with the
opportunity to partially free-ride on those who can. In this way, for a given Calvo parameter, prices will be much less sticky in a sector with higher
degree of indexation.
6 Note that in the model domestic inﬂation coincides with CPI inﬂation. The empirical estimate of the feedback coefﬁcients suggests that the monetary
policy hardly cares about the nominal exchange rate, once the indirect effects of nominal exchange rate movements (working through the marginal
cost of production) are controlled for.
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THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE MODEL
The instrument of monetary policy is the nominal interest rate, i.e. the cost of borrowing in domestic
currency. However, by moving the instrument, monetary policy has inﬂuence on the economy through two
channels. The ﬁrst is the usual aggregate demand channel also present in a closed economy. In a simple closed
economy setup, changes in the cost of borrowing affect households’ consumption decisions (and, hence,
aggregate demand) through the Euler equation. With the appropriate monetary policy response, the central
bank can manipulate demand, and, consequently, "close the output gap" for shocks hitting the economy.
In an open economy, the exchange rate channel adds to the monetary transmission mechanism. A change
in the policy rate alters the nominal exchange rate via the uncovered interest parity condition, and – in
our setup – induces supply-side reactions as well. First, a nominal appreciation, say, lowers the cost of
imported inputs, and hence the marginal cost of production in domestic currency. Second, with export
prices sticky in foreign currency, it lowers the proﬁtability of the export sector (or increases the marginal
cost of exports in terms of foreign currency). Note that neither of these "supply-side" effects are present in
the simple small open-economy models with imports as consumption goods and one sector with producer
currency pricing. Therefore we are primarily interested in whether deviations from these simple modelling
assumptions, towards what we believe to be a more realistic setup, change the normative implications for
monetary policy.
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3 Optimal monetary policy and optimal simple
rules
OPTIMAL POLICY
We deﬁne optimal policy as the one under commitment that maximizes households’ lifetime utility subject
to competitive equilibrium conditions, given the exogenous stochastic processes of the shocks and the past
values of the endogenous variables. As common in the optimal policy literature and following Woodford, we
assume a particular recursive formulation of the policy commitment. This imposes that the policy rule that
is foundoptimal in thelatter periods isalso adhered toin the initialone (whereprivate sector expectationsare
already formed), due to time-consistency and credibility reasons. The policy rule that satisﬁes this property
is called optimal from a timeless perspective.
A general assumption in optimal monetary policy calculations is that the ﬁscal policy can eliminate ﬁrst-
order distortions due to monopolistic competition by properly subsidising goods and labor markets. While
theoretically appealing, we refrain from this unrealistic assumption. The reason for this is that our primary
objective is practical guidance to monetary policy.
Finally, an optimal policy for households’ preferences given by (1) implies very aggressive policy responses,
or put differently, implausibly large ﬂuctuations in the policy instrument.7 However, this is not what we see
in practice. Real-world policymakers seem to prefer more gradual and persistent movements in the nominal
interest rate, presumably because of ﬁnancial stability considerations. Our baseline model above doesn’t take
this motive into account. We can correct for this by including an interest-smoothing motive into the utility





























where the ﬁrst two terms are identical to the terms in the households’ utility function, while the last one is
responsible for smoothing out interest rate ﬂuctuations by "punishing" any deviation of the interest factor
(1+it) from its steady-state value (1/β).






given private sector decisions, market equilibrium conditions and appropriate initial ("precommitted") val-
ues for forward-looking variables and Lagrange multipliers. The solution of the problem gives the policy
instrument as a function of state variables and shocks, that can be obtained using numerical methods. We
apply a standardized algorithm provided by Altissimo et al. (2005) to derive the optimal instrument rule.
7 Large swings in the policy rate would also imply that the policy rate might hit the zero lower bound. Imposing some restriction on the variability of the
policy rate rules out this possibilty.




























where Mt is the nominal money stock, and m is the targeted level of real money balances, then plugging the ﬁrst order condition on real money
holdings (U￿
M/P/U￿
C = (1+i)/i) back to the utility function leads to the expression of V above. Note that our calibrated value for ￿M implies that
the term associated with real money balances has a negligibe weight in the utility function.
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OPTIMAL SIMPLE RULES
The optimal instrument rule derived in the last subsection represents a useful benchmark for policy evalu-
ation. However, as it is a function of a wide range of unobservables, it is hardly operational from a central
bank perspective. From a practical perspective it is often more convenient to refer to optimal simple rules
that approximate the welfare-maximizing policy, but similarly to the estimated empirical rule react to ob-
servable variables only. Moreover, simple rules are more directly comparable to the estimated one, as we can
easily compare the feedback coefﬁcients if the rules are in similar functional forms.














and search for optimised feedback coefﬁcients, that is we solve for






represents the vector of feedback coefﬁcients in (25).
From the literature on optimal monetary policy (see Section 1) we know that monetary policy should ideally
seek to eliminate distortions generated by nominal rigidities. There are three sources of such microeconomic
distortions (stickiness in domestic and export price setting, and stickiness in wage setting) in the model, thus
three inefﬁciency wedges the monetary policy should try to close. Intuitively, optimal simple rules should
target variables that are intimately related to the wedges. Domestic inﬂation, wage inﬂation and the exchange
rate are natural candidates for such target variables. A feedback rule reacting to domestic price inﬂation seeks
to eliminate unintended markup ﬂuctuations arising from price stickiness in the domestic sector, and the
reaction to wage inﬂation is supposed to reduce the inefﬁciency wedges in the labor market. With reacting to
the exchange rate, the monetary policy can reduce the inefﬁciency wedge for exporters. Of course reacting
to these wedges may easily yield conﬂicting implications for the setting of a single instrument. On the
other hand, the opposite can also hold: a change in the instrument aimed to deal with a particular kind of
inefﬁciency, can have positive effects on some other.
CALIBRATION ISSUES
Before we turn to the comparative analysis, we need to restrict some parameters in order to get comparable
results.
First, we calibrated ￿M, the term in the policymaker’s objective function (23) that governs the interest
smoothing motive. We set the parameter to ensure that the variance of the change in the policy rate un-
der the optimal rule is set to match the empirical value. That is, ￿M was chosen to make the following
equation hold:
Var(it/it−1)empirical =Var(it/it−1)optimal,
where the RHS is a function of ￿M. The intuition behind is that the desire for smoothing the policy rate
is a revealed preference of the policymaker, that is reﬂected in the empirical variance. To pounce on the
importance of this motive, we take actual decisions as a benchmark, and calibrate the preference parameter
to match the empirical variance of the policy rate.
Second, somewhat similarly, for the optimal simple rules we restricted the parameter of interest rate smooth-




where osr refers to all proposed forms of the optimal simple rules. By doing so, we took the revealed
smoothing motive as given, and concentrated only on the feedback parameters.
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SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE
We complete the following comparative exercises.
• First, we explore the performance of the fully optimal rule (that is, the solution to the policymaker’s
problem), and compare it to the estimated one. By doing so, we seek for systematic differences in
stabilization properties. Stabilization is captured by the implied volatility of selected nominal and real
variables. The impulse responses to different types of shocks under the different policy rules can help
us to understand the mechanisms at work.
• Next, we include the optimal simple rules into the comparative exercise. We examine, on the one
hand, how successful the simple rules are in replicating the performance of the fully optimal one, and,
on the other hand, the systematic differences from the empirical rule. The overall performance of the
rules is reﬂected in the value of the policymaker’s objective, W0 in (24). To have a comparable welfare
measure, we calculate the share of steady state consumption necessary to compensate for following
a particular type of rule instead of the fully optimal one. Also, the potential utility gain (in terms
of steady state consumption equivalent) of including the exchange rate or the measure of wage inﬂa-
tion into the feedback rule allows us to assess the relative welfare costs of different types of nominal
rigidities.
• The next exercise consists of comparing optimized policy rules with different feedback variables. The
comparative analysis of simple rules allow us to judge the stabilization properties of different policy
rules when monetary policy reacts to variables other than domestic inﬂation. Moreover, the optimised
relative weights on the feedback parameters are interesting in themselves.
• Finally, we carry out sensitivity analysis on some structural parameters of the economy. Speciﬁcally,
we study how the optimised coefﬁcients for the simple feedback rules change if the openness (proxied
by the steady state share of imports) of the economy is different.
SET OF POLICY RULES COMPARED
We analyse the performance and stabilization properties of the following rules:
1. the estimated empirical rule (denoted hereafter by EMP),
2. the fully optimal policy rule (LQ),
3. the simple rule with the optimised coefﬁcient reacting to domestic inﬂation only (OSR1),
4. thesimplerulewithoptimisedcoefﬁcientsreactingtodomesticinﬂationandtheexchangerate(OSR2),
5. the simple rule with optimised coefﬁcients reacting to domestic inﬂation and wage inﬂation (OSR3).
A summary of the rules is given in the next table.
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Table 1














































Optimising onςπ,ςπw, restriction onςi
Table 2
Volatility of selected variables under optimal monetary policy and the empirical rule
Variable LQ EMP
domestic inﬂation (π) 0.310 0.761
wage inﬂation (πw) 0.0491 0.574
real exchange rate (q) 107.179 144.695





export output (yx) 9.979 10.046
consumption (c) 39.844 31.456
RESULTS
Comparing optimal policy with the empirical rule
Our ﬁrst exercise consists of comparing the fully optimal policy to the estimated rule. First, volatilities of
selected variables provide an indication of their stabilization performance. These are reported in Table 2.
The ﬁgures in the table suggest that compared to the estimated rule, optimal monetary policy smooths out
the paths of the nominal variables. This is a general ﬁnding for all nominal variables (domestic and wage
inﬂation, nominal exchange rate), but applies most strikingly to wage inﬂation. In Appendix C, we plotted
impulse responses for selected shocks (productivity, government consumption, import prices, and export
demand) under the optimal and the empirical rule.9 The ﬁgures reinforce that for all the shocks plotted, the
nominalvariablesreturntotheirsteadystatevaluesmorerapidlythanrealvariables. Thisisquiteinlinewith
intuition: the best that monetary policy can achieve under a time-consistent rule is to eliminate relative price
distortions (inefﬁciencies generated by nominal rigidities). Stabilizing nominal variables (domestic prices and
wages) has exactly this effect, as it indicates that monetary policy has successfully eliminated all incentives
for adjusting prices, i.e. closed the inefﬁciency wedge ("output gap" for the domestic price setters, and the
"marginal rate of substitution gap" for wage setting unions). Note that the stabilization performance of the
optimal policy is most signiﬁcant for wage inﬂation.
The empirical rule generates excess smoothness in real variables, particularly in consumption. This is a
natural consequence of the fact that the estimated policy rule is quite "dovish". In face of shocks hitting
9 The shocks were chosen to represent an evenly distributed sample of the sources of exogenous variation: there are two shocks with domestic and two
with foreign origin, two hitting the demand side of the economy (government spending, export demand), and two affecting the suplly side (productivity,
import prices). In the full-ﬂedged model of the economy, there are much more shocks that could be analysed, though we believe that our selection of
them gives a balanced picture on the performance of different rules.
MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/4 15MNB WORKiNg pApERS • 2010/4 19
COMpARATiVE ANAlYSiS OF MONETARY pOliCY RulES
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
the economy, the empirical rule with modest feedback coefﬁcients, doesn’t imply aggressive movements in
the nominal rate, and hence only very subdued movements in the real rate. As a consequence, the path of
consumption is smoothed out, too. Note that with ﬂexible prices, the real interest rate would strongly adjust
to shocks, and consumption would be more volatile, and that is exactly the allocation the optimal policy
seems to replicate.
Comparing optimal policy, optimal simple rules and the empirical rule
First, we would like to know how close the simple rules can get to the fully optimal one. To assess wel-
fare implications of alternative monetary policy rules, we recall the consumption equivalent welfare measure
originally introduced by Lucas in his famous Lucas (1987) volume. In our case it would mean the percentage
difference of the (steady state) level of consumption that would make the representative consumer indiffer-
ent (in terms of utility) in between the different macroeconomic outcomes created by alternative monetary
policy rules. This measure for different policy rules are presented in the next table.
Table 3
Welfare gain from following different policy rules (in terms of steady state consumption)
Welfare gain relative to LQ EMP OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
LQ policy 0 −0.1 −0.07 −0.07 −0.04
Empirical rule 0.1 0 0.03 0.03 0.06
The ﬁrst line of the table tells us that the welfare consequences of following suboptimal monetary policies
are huge. That is, shifting to the LQ policy from the empirical one creates a welfare gain amounting to
10 percent of steady state consumption. This looks like a dramatic and somewhat implausible difference.
However, the corresponding ﬁgures in the optimal monetary policy literature are generally calculated in
models with much less frictions. With the possible sources of inefﬁciencies increasing, the advantage of the
fully optimal policy is expected to grow as well. Moreover, we restricted our analysis to very simple rules
(with at most two feedback variables) that clearly cannot handle the full range of possible shocks.
Turning to the optimal simple rules, the welfare analysis also indicates that switching from the empirical to
an optimal simple rule can signiﬁcantly improve welfare. This is true even in the case where the functional
form and the feedback variables of the policy rule remain unchanged (OSR1, OSR2). Another interesting
implication of the analysis is that including the nominal exchange rate into the policy rule doesn’t have a
signiﬁcant effect. However, targeting also nominal wage inﬂation does imply sizeable welfare gains, in line
with our prior belief that nominal rigidities in wage setting cause severe inefﬁciencies in the labor market.
A more easily interpretable measure of the relative performance of different policy rules is the amount of
volatility they imply for selected variables in percent of the implied volatility under the empirical rule. This
is shown in Table 4.
The ﬁgures above reinforce our ﬁnding from the previous section: the empirical rule seems to oversmooth
real variables (most notably, consumption), while signiﬁcant welfare improvements can be achieved by reduc-
ing he volatility of nominal variables. The impulse responses (presented in Appendix C) to selected shocks
under the optimal simple and the empirical rule are also in line with this result.
Comparing different optimal simple rules
The differences among the optimal simple rules in terms of welfare gains and stabilization performance are
reﬂected in the optimised feedback coefﬁcients, too. These are reported in Table 5.
Noteﬁrst, thatalltheoptimalsimplerulesgiveamuchhigherfeedbackcoefﬁcienttodomesticinﬂation. This
also implies that all the optimal simple rules involve much more variation in the domestic real interest rate,
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Table 4
Volatility of selected variables under different monetary policy rules (in % of the volatility under the empirical rule)
Variable LQ OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
domestic inﬂation (π) 40,70% 40,74% 39,55% 37,71%
wage inﬂation (πw) 8,50% 29,79% 27,53% 27,70%
real exchange rate (q) 74,00% 91,53% 85,06% 93,14%




94,10% 97,29% 97,32% 97,41%
export output (yx) 99,30% 102,66% 101,90% 102,79%
consumption (c) 126,60% 127,36% 128,93% 132,52%
Table 5
Optimised feedback coefﬁcients in the empirical and different optimal simple rules
Optimised feedback parameter to EMP OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
inﬂation (π) 1.375 4.77 5.08 2.8
exchange rate (de) 0.025 0 0.27 0
wage inﬂation (πw) 0 0 0 9.12
and thus a more volatile consumption path. Second, if the nominal exchange rate is included in the policy
rule, itgetsamuchloweroptimisedcoefﬁcientthandomesticinﬂation. Third, thepolicyrulereactingalsoto
wage inﬂation gives a much higher weight on the measure of wage inﬂation than on domestic price inﬂation.
This is in line with our intuition that monetary policy should ideally care more about the stickier "sector"
and attach higher weights to reacting to inﬂation that is supposed to generate more inefﬁciencies.
Comparing optimal monetary policy with different degrees of openness
In our last comparative exercise, we do a sensitivity analysis on openness. We compare our baseline model
with a hypothetical economy that is very similar to Hungary, but is less open. Otherwise, the thought
experiment leaves all the estimated structural parameters of the economy unchanged. We proxy openness by
the steady state share of imports in production.10
Stabilisation properties of the fully optimal policy in the more and the less open economy are reported in
Table 6.
The table tells us that by increasing openness, optimal monetary policy stabilizes nominal variables by more
and domestic real variables by less. However, from the ﬁgures above it is not clear whether it is the difference
in the transmission mechanism or in the welfare implications of the same amount of ﬂuctuations (and hence,
the policymaker’s objective) that drives the result. Examining the optimised feedback coefﬁcients can give a
hint (see next table).
From Table 7, we conclude that in a more open economy, monetary policy becomes more concerned about
stabilizing inﬂation. That is, the weights attached to inﬂation is signiﬁcantly increased in all speciﬁcations.
Moreover, therelativeimportanceofdomesticinﬂation(asreﬂectedbytherelativemagnitudeofthefeedback
coefﬁcient on inﬂation to other variables) also increases with openness.
10 Speciﬁcally, the share of imports in marginal cost is 0.6 in the export and 0.4 in the domestic sector for our baseline calibration. This implies a
steady state share of imports to GDP amounting to 100% which is the approximate value for the Hungarian economy. In the less open economy, the
corresponding ﬁgures are 0.2 for both sectors, implying imports having a 25% share in steady state GDP. We will refer to the latter parametrizaion as
the "moderately open" economy.
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Table 4
Volatility of selected variables under different monetary policy rules (in % of the volatility under the empirical rule)
Variable LQ OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
domestic inﬂation (π) 40,70% 40,74% 39,55% 37,71%
wage inﬂation (πw) 8,50% 29,79% 27,53% 27,70%
real exchange rate (q) 74,00% 91,53% 85,06% 93,14%




94,10% 97,29% 97,32% 97,41%
export output (yx) 99,30% 102,66% 101,90% 102,79%
consumption (c) 126,60% 127,36% 128,93% 132,52%
Table 5
Optimised feedback coefﬁcients in the empirical and different optimal simple rules
Optimised feedback parameter to EMP OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
inﬂation (π) 1.375 4.77 5.08 2.8
exchange rate (de) 0.025 0 0.27 0
wage inﬂation (πw) 0 0 0 9.12
and thus a more volatile consumption path. Second, if the nominal exchange rate is included in the policy
rule, itgetsamuchloweroptimisedcoefﬁcientthandomesticinﬂation. Third, thepolicyrulereactingalsoto
wage inﬂation gives a much higher weight on the measure of wage inﬂation than on domestic price inﬂation.
This is in line with our intuition that monetary policy should ideally care more about the stickier "sector"
and attach higher weights to reacting to inﬂation that is supposed to generate more inefﬁciencies.
Comparing optimal monetary policy with different degrees of openness
In our last comparative exercise, we do a sensitivity analysis on openness. We compare our baseline model
with a hypothetical economy that is very similar to Hungary, but is less open. Otherwise, the thought
experiment leaves all the estimated structural parameters of the economy unchanged. We proxy openness by
the steady state share of imports in production.10
Stabilisation properties of the fully optimal policy in the more and the less open economy are reported in
Table 6.
The table tells us that by increasing openness, optimal monetary policy stabilizes nominal variables by more
and domestic real variables by less. However, from the ﬁgures above it is not clear whether it is the difference
in the transmission mechanism or in the welfare implications of the same amount of ﬂuctuations (and hence,
the policymaker’s objective) that drives the result. Examining the optimised feedback coefﬁcients can give a
hint (see next table).
From Table 7, we conclude that in a more open economy, monetary policy becomes more concerned about
stabilizing inﬂation. That is, the weights attached to inﬂation is signiﬁcantly increased in all speciﬁcations.
Moreover, therelativeimportanceofdomesticinﬂation(asreﬂectedbytherelativemagnitudeofthefeedback
coefﬁcient on inﬂation to other variables) also increases with openness.
10 Speciﬁcally, the share of imports in marginal cost is 0.6 in the export and 0.4 in the domestic sector for our baseline calibration. This implies a
steady state share of imports to GDP amounting to 100% which is the approximate value for the Hungarian economy. In the less open economy, the
corresponding ﬁgures are 0.2 for both sectors, implying imports having a 25% share in steady state GDP. We will refer to the latter parametrizaion as
the "moderately open" economy.
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Table 6
Volatility of selected variables under the optimal monetary policy in the baseline and the "moderately open" econ-
omy
Variable Baseline "Moderately open"
domestic inﬂation (π) 0.310 0.335
wage inﬂation (πw) 0.049 0.075
real exchange rate (q) 107.179 142.488





export output (yx) 9.979 15.686
consumption (c) 39.844 22.266
Table 7
Optimised feedback coefﬁcients in the baseline and the "moderately open" economy
Baseline Moderately open
Optimised feedback parameter to OSR1 OSR2 OSR3 OSR1 OSR2 OSR3
inﬂation (π) 4.77 5.08 2.8 2.66 2.66 0.85
exchange rate (de) 0 0.27 0 0 0.06 0
wage inﬂation (πw) 0 0 9.12 0 0 3.41
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5 Conclusions an directions for further research
In this paper, we examined optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model for Hungary. We got the following
results.
Compared to optimal policy, the empirical rule implies excess smoothing of real domestic variables, and excess
volatility of nominal variables. The best a credible monetary policy can achieve is to reduce inefﬁciencies
generated by nominal rigidities. Stabilizing nominal variables has exactly this effect, as it indicates that
monetary policy has successfully eliminated all incentives for adjusting prices, i.e. closed the inefﬁciency
wedges. Theexcesssmoothnessinrealvariables, particularlyinconsumption, thatcharacterizestheempirical
rule is a natural consequence of the estimated policy rule being "dovish". In face of shocks hitting the
economy, the empirical rule with its modest feedback coefﬁcients, doesn’t imply aggressive movements in
the nominal rate, and hence generates only very subdued movements in the real rate. As a consequence,
the path of consumption is smoothed out, too. Note that with ﬂexible prices, the real interest rate would
strongly adjust to shocks, and consumption would be more volatile, and that is exactly the allocation optimal
policy seems to replicate.
Simple optimal rules can approximate the fully optimal policy relatively well. Sizeable welfare gains can be
achieved with the optimised feedback coefﬁcients relative to the estimated rule. Simple policy rules with
a higher coefﬁcient on inﬂation relative to the estimated one imply more variable real interest rates and,
consequently, more volatility in real variables. On the other hand, this also means that they reduce the
variability of nominal variables.
Adding the nominal exchange rate to the policy rule doesn’t improve welfare or the stabilization properties of the
optimal simple rule. This results suggests that optimal monetary policy should not target the wedge related to
pricestickinessoftheexportsectorseparately. Thereasonbehindisthatﬂuctuationsinthenominalexchange
ratecausingunintendedvariationsinexporters’markup arealreadycorrectedfor whenthemonetaryauthor-
ity aims to eliminate the inefﬁciency wedge of domestic producers, and thus are already controlled with the
coefﬁcient on domestic inﬂation. Moreover, responding to the exchange rate creates additional variance for
domestic producers through the marginal cost channel, while responding to inﬂation has no such externality
for the export sector.
Including wage inﬂation into the policy rule implies signiﬁcant improvement in welfare. This result suggest that
the welfare loss associated with sticky wage setting is more severe than those related to nominal rigidities in
product markets. This is in line with the empirical estimates of wage stickiness. Furthermore, as imports are
not consumed, the nominal exchange rate (a more conventional target variable for monetary policy) cannot
close the inefﬁciency gap generated by sticky wage setting.
With increasing openness optimal monetary policy gets more concerned with stabilizing nominal, as opposed to
real variables. Opening up the economy offers new channels of adjustment. In the two-sector open economy
all shocks bring about changes in intratemporal relative prices. Movements in the terms-of-trade and the
real exchange rate, then, provide incentives for reallocation of productive resources between sectors, and
substitution of inputs for each other. The new channels of adjustment have consequences on the general
conduct of optimal monetary policy as they provide more ﬂexibility in terms of real adjustment. If real
adjustment is less painful, the welfare loss associated with real (output) ﬂuctuations becomes less important
relative to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. Therefore, the inﬂation-output trade-off becomes tilted towards inﬂation
stabilization.
Optimal policy should react to domestic inﬂation more strongly in a more open economy. For very open
economies, the central bank can ignore exporters, because they basically re-export and hence are unaffected
by foreign price stickiness. This allows the bank to respond fully to changes in inﬂation. But with moderate
openness, the inefﬁciency created by sticky price setting in the export sector must be taken into account, re-
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sulting in a less aggressive policy, because exporters are partially shielded from the full effect of depreciation
due to selling in the foreign currency.
Ourresultssuggeststhatasimpleinﬂationtargetingrulewithahighenoughfeedbackcoefﬁcientondomestic
inﬂation can approximate the welfare-maximizing monetary policy relatively well. Surprisingly, after intro-
ducing a wide range of nominal frictions and a completely different way of modelling openness, we got back
the classical result of the "science of monetary policy". However, this builds on some crucial assumptions
(high share of imports in export sector marginal cost, perfect exchange rate pass-through for import prices,
broadly similar movements in marginal costs for both sectors, no imported consumption) that all help in
getting this result. A further research is needed to examine these assumptions and check the robustness of
our conclusions to relaxing them.
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Compared to optimal policy, the empirical rule implies excess smoothing of real domestic variables, and excess
volatility of nominal variables. The best a credible monetary policy can achieve is to reduce inefﬁciencies
generated by nominal rigidities. Stabilizing nominal variables has exactly this effect, as it indicates that
monetary policy has successfully eliminated all incentives for adjusting prices, i.e. closed the inefﬁciency
wedges. Theexcesssmoothnessinrealvariables, particularlyinconsumption, thatcharacterizestheempirical
rule is a natural consequence of the estimated policy rule being "dovish". In face of shocks hitting the
economy, the empirical rule with its modest feedback coefﬁcients, doesn’t imply aggressive movements in
the nominal rate, and hence generates only very subdued movements in the real rate. As a consequence,
the path of consumption is smoothed out, too. Note that with ﬂexible prices, the real interest rate would
strongly adjust to shocks, and consumption would be more volatile, and that is exactly the allocation optimal
policy seems to replicate.
Simple optimal rules can approximate the fully optimal policy relatively well. Sizeable welfare gains can be
achieved with the optimised feedback coefﬁcients relative to the estimated rule. Simple policy rules with
a higher coefﬁcient on inﬂation relative to the estimated one imply more variable real interest rates and,
consequently, more volatility in real variables. On the other hand, this also means that they reduce the
variability of nominal variables.
Adding the nominal exchange rate to the policy rule doesn’t improve welfare or the stabilization properties of the
optimal simple rule. This results suggests that optimal monetary policy should not target the wedge related to
pricestickinessoftheexportsectorseparately. Thereasonbehindisthatﬂuctuationsinthenominalexchange
ratecausingunintendedvariationsinexporters’markup arealreadycorrectedfor whenthemonetaryauthor-
ity aims to eliminate the inefﬁciency wedge of domestic producers, and thus are already controlled with the
coefﬁcient on domestic inﬂation. Moreover, responding to the exchange rate creates additional variance for
domestic producers through the marginal cost channel, while responding to inﬂation has no such externality
for the export sector.
Including wage inﬂation into the policy rule implies signiﬁcant improvement in welfare. This result suggest that
the welfare loss associated with sticky wage setting is more severe than those related to nominal rigidities in
product markets. This is in line with the empirical estimates of wage stickiness. Furthermore, as imports are
not consumed, the nominal exchange rate (a more conventional target variable for monetary policy) cannot
close the inefﬁciency gap generated by sticky wage setting.
With increasing openness optimal monetary policy gets more concerned with stabilizing nominal, as opposed to
real variables. Opening up the economy offers new channels of adjustment. In the two-sector open economy
all shocks bring about changes in intratemporal relative prices. Movements in the terms-of-trade and the
real exchange rate, then, provide incentives for reallocation of productive resources between sectors, and
substitution of inputs for each other. The new channels of adjustment have consequences on the general
conduct of optimal monetary policy as they provide more ﬂexibility in terms of real adjustment. If real
adjustment is less painful, the welfare loss associated with real (output) ﬂuctuations becomes less important
relative to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. Therefore, the inﬂation-output trade-off becomes tilted towards inﬂation
stabilization.
Optimal policy should react to domestic inﬂation more strongly in a more open economy. For very open
economies, the central bank can ignore exporters, because they basically re-export and hence are unaffected
by foreign price stickiness. This allows the bank to respond fully to changes in inﬂation. But with moderate
openness, the inefﬁciency created by sticky price setting in the export sector must be taken into account, re-
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sulting in a less aggressive policy, because exporters are partially shielded from the full effect of depreciation
due to selling in the foreign currency.
Ourresultssuggeststhatasimpleinﬂationtargetingrulewithahighenoughfeedbackcoefﬁcientondomestic
inﬂation can approximate the welfare-maximizing monetary policy relatively well. Surprisingly, after intro-
ducing a wide range of nominal frictions and a completely different way of modelling openness, we got back
the classical result of the "science of monetary policy". However, this builds on some crucial assumptions
(high share of imports in export sector marginal cost, perfect exchange rate pass-through for import prices,
broadly similar movements in marginal costs for both sectors, no imported consumption) that all help in
getting this result. A further research is needed to examine these assumptions and check the robustness of
our conclusions to relaxing them.
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THE LOG-LINEARIZED MODEL
Appendices
A The log-linearized model
This section reviews the log-linearized model equations. The tilde denotes the log-deviation of a variable
from its steady-state value. Variables without time indices represent their steady-state values.
AGGREGATE DEMAND

































The arbitrage condition equating expected yields on capital services and bonds, is described by
Et
￿















































Capital accumulation equation is standard.
˜ kt+1 = (1−δ)˜ kt +δ˜ It +˜ ￿k
t .
The log-linear version of the export-demand equation is
˜ xt = hx˜ xt−1 −θx ˜ P x∗
t + ˜ x∗
t .
Equilibrium conditions on domestic and export markets, respectively,
yd ˜ yd
t = c˜ ct +I ˜ It + g ˜ gt + r kkdψ˜ r k
t ,
yx˜ yx
t = x˜ xt + r kkxψ˜ r k
t ,
where the last term stands for the r kkψ˜ r k
t the loss associated with changes in capacity utilization.






























− ￿ At, s = d, x,
where f s = ¯ f s/y representstheshareofﬁxcostsinsteadyproduction, while￿istheelasticityofsubstitution
between k and z (the composite input). The price of z, denoted by wz is the weighted average cost of labor
( ￿ wt) and imports (˜ qt + ￿ P m∗
t ), net of adjustment costs (φz):
￿ wzs
t = as ￿ wt +(1−as)
￿




t, s = d, x.
˜ qt = ˜ et − ￿ Pt,




˜ qt + ￿ P m∗
t − ￿ wt
￿
+ ˜ zs








t, s = d,x,
and the aggregate quantities of the individual inputs are given by
l ˜ lt = ld ˜ ld
t + l x˜ l x
t ,
m ￿ mt = md ￿ md
t + mx ￿ mx
t ,
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t − ¯ πx∗
t , πx∗
t = ￿ P x∗











Wage setting in the model is based on similar assumptions as price formation. In can be shown that the





















˜ ct − h˜ ct−1
￿


















t = ￿ wt − ￿ wt−1 + ˆ πt.
CURRENT ACCOUNT
The evolution of net foreign assets is given by:












t + ￿ mt
￿
,
since it is assumed that b = 0, ˜ bt = bt/GDP∗, where GDP∗ = yd +qP x∗x −qP m∗m.
THE INTEREST RATE AND THE EXCHANGE RATE
Uncovered interest rate parity with ﬁnancial premium shock can be expressed as








following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002), it is assumed that ˜ ı∗
t = −ν˜ bt, this assumption ensures stationary
of ˜ bt.
In the inﬂation-targeting regime the behavior of the monetary authority is captured by the following interest-
rate rule.
ˆ ıt = ζ iˆ ıt1 +(1−ζ i)
￿






Note, that the only role of ζ
it
e > 0 is to ensure the stationarity of ˆ et.
The evolution of the real exchange rate is determined by the following identity.
˜ qt − ˜ qt−1 = dˆ et − ˆ πt.








standard error of gov’t. consumption σ g 4.72
standard error of import prices σ pm∗ 2.19
standard error of capital measurement error σk 0.15
autoreg. coeff. of gov’t. consumption ρg 0.46
autoreg. coeff. of import prices ρpm∗ 0.74
autoreg. coeff of capital measurement error ρk 0.60
autoreg. coeff of perceived average inﬂation ρ¯ π 0.99
TableParFix discount factor β 0.99
steady-state share of capital in real marginal costs, domestic αd 0.17
steady-state share of capital in real marginal costs, export αd 0.14
steady-state share of labor in wz
t ,domestic ad 0.50
steady-state share of labor in wz
t , export ax 0.30
depreciation rate δ 0.025
elasticity of subt. of goods θ 6.00
elasticity of subt. of labor θw 3.00
disutility parameter of labour ϕ 8.00
Calvo parameter of employment γ n 0.70
elasticity of subt. between capital and z ￿ 0.80
elasticity of subt. between labor and import ￿z 0.50
ratio of ﬁxed cost relative to total output ¯ fd,
¯ fx 0.20
capacity utilization adj. cost ψ 0.20
investments adjustment cost Φ￿￿ 13.00
labour utilization adjustment cost Φ￿￿
l 3.00
import utilization adjustment cost Φ￿￿
m 3.00
exchange rate elasticity of the policy rule ζ
it
e 0.025
debt elasticity of ﬁnancial premium ν 0.001
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PARAMETERS
Table 9
Estimated parameters of exogenous shocks
Prior distribution Estimated posterior
Stand. 90%
Type Mean err. Mode Mean prob. int.
Standard errors
productivity σA I.Gam. 0.5 2* 2.080 2.152 [1.82,2.55]
export demand σx I.Gam. 0.5 2* 2.352 2.464 [2.06,2.95]
cons. pref. σc I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.146 0.203 [0.11,0.33]
cons. price markup σ p I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.397 0.420 [0.34,0.52]
export price markup σ px I.Gam. 0.5 2* 1.873 2.182 [1.64,2.87]
labor market σit
w I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.609 0.932 [0.54,1.42]
investments σI I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.969 1.003 [0.76,1.27]
Equity premium σQ I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.167 0.393 [0.11,0.99]
policy rule σcr
r I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.574 0.602 [0.48,0.76]
policy rule σit
r I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.229 0.247 [0.19,0.32]
ﬁn. premium σit
pr I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.486 0.666 [0.36,1.06]
employment σn I.Gam. 0.5 2* 0.369 0.383 [0.30,0.49]
Autoregressive coefﬁcients
productivity ρA Beta 0.8 0.1 0.577 0.552 [0.43,0.68]
export demand ρx Beta 0.8 0.1 0.616 0.625 [0.51,0.73]
cons. pref. ρc Beta 0.8 0.1 0.833 0.767 [0.60,0.88]
labor market ρit
w Beta 0.8 0.1 0.797 0.661 [0.43,0.87]
export markup ρx Beta 0.5 0.15 0.317 0.318 [0.15,0.50]
investments ρI Beta 0.8 0.1 0.497 0.488 [0.33,0.65]
ﬁn. premium ρit
pr Beta 0.8 0.1 0.872 0.820 [0.70,0.92]
employment ρn Beta 0.8 0.1 0.790 0.770 [0.64,0.89]
∗For the Inverted Gamma function the degrees of freedom are indicated.
Table 10
Structural parameters
Prior distribution Estimated posterior
Stand. 90%
Type Mean err. Mode Mean prob. int.
Utility function parameters
consumption σ Norm. 2.00 0.40 1.680 1.814 [1.18,2.46]
habit h Beta 0.75 0.15 0.597 0.646 [0.45,0.83]
Price and wage setting param.
ind. cons. prices ϑ
it
p Beta 0.60 0.20 0.416 0.431 [0.22,0.66]
ind. exp. prices ϑ
it
x Beta 0.60 0.20 0.383 0.494 [0.18,0.83]
ind. wages ϑ
it
w Beta 0.60 0.20 0.107 0.185 [0.05,0.40]
Calvo cons. prices γ it
p Beta 0.50 0.20 0.929 0.921 [0.88,0.95]
Calvo exp. prices γ it
x Beta 0.50 0.20 0.827 0.810 [0.73,0.89]
Calvo wages γ it
w Beta 0.50 0.20 0.711 0.657 [0.46,0.88]
Other parameters
exp. elasticity θx Beta 0.50 0.10 0.510 0.534 [0.40,0.67]
exp. smooth. hx Beta 0.75 0.15 0.503 0.507 [0.35,0.66]
ir. smooth. ζ i U(0,1) 0.50 0.29 0.766 0.761 [0.67,0.84]
policy rule ζ π Norm. 1.50 0.16 1.375 1.379 [1.12,1.65]
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C Impulse responses
COMPARING THE FULLY OPTIMAL RULE AND THE EMPIRICAL ONE
Figure 1
Productivity shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
































Productivity shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
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Figure 1
Productivity shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
































Productivity shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
































28 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/4MAgYAR NEMZETi BANK
MNB WORKiNg pApERS • 2010/4 32
IMPULSE RESPONSES
Figure 3
Government spending shock(LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
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Government spending shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)











































Export demand shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
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Export demand shock (LQ solid red, EMP dashed black)
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COMPARING THE EMPIRICAL RULE TO THE OSRS
Figure 9
Productivity shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)





































Productivity shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)








































Government spending shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)
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Government spending shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)
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Figure 13
Export demand shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)



































Export demand shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)










































Import price shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)



































Import price shock (EMP solid, OSR1 dashed, OSR2 dotted, OSR3 dashed-dotted)
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